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Open Source, Open Access, and Open Transfer:
Market Approaches to Research Bottlenecks
By Robin Feldman' and Kris Nelson"
One of the most hotly contested issues in the field of intellectual property law
concerns the existence, or non-existence, of'patent thickets and the extent to
which any such bottlenecks may be interfering with research. For decades,
scholars warned that problems related to the over proliferation of patent rights
would interfere with innovation. In contrast, a growing body qt commentary
argues that patent thickets are not a problem in modern industries. Either patent
thickets do not exist, or if they do, patent thickets do not inter/cre with the
progress of research.
The rhetoric is particularly heated these days because of dramatic changes
underway in patent law. Research bottlenecks, or lack thereofi are invoked
either in support of or in opposition to such changes, and it is difficult to have a
rational discussion when so much seems to be at stake.
Stepping back from the rhetoric a bit, this Article suggests that one can
sometimes indirectly observe e/jcts, even if one cannot directly measure the
extent of a phenomenon. With this in mind, the Article describes three
approaches appearing in modern patent markets that are directed at mitigating
the e/ffects of patent thickets. These approaches can be described as Open
Source, Open Access, and Open Transfer. From our vantage point, we may not
be able to ,see or to measure the depth of the thicket. We can, however, observe
the altered growth patterns that give us some indication of where the problems
lie.
One of the most hotly contested issues in the field of intellectual property law is the
extent to which legally created rights may be inhibiting, rather than promoting, scientific
research. Although intellectual property rights are designed to encourage scientific
progress, over proliferation or distortion of an optimal arrangement of rights could create
bottlenecks that obstruct the (low o" research. The debate plays out in themes related to
the ways in which both patent and copyright law may be obstructing scientific research at
commercial and academic institutions.
On the patent front, a key debate concerns the existence, or non-existence, of
bottlenecks such as patent thickets and the extent to which any patent thickets may be
interfering with research. For decades, scholars warned that problems related to the over
proliferation of patent rights would interfere with innovation.' In theory, multiple
* Professor of Law, Director, Law & Bioscience Project, University of California [Iastings College of
tile Law.* University of Califlrnia Hastings College of the Law, Candidate for .I.D., 2009.
1 See, e.g., Rebecca S Eisenberg, Bargaining over the Transfer ?fProprietary Research Tools': Is This
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overlapping patent rights can hamper innovation by creating high transactions costs as
researchers try to navigate the tangle of existing rights. These costs call discourage
investment in research or distort the paths that researchers take due to the difficulty of
identifying and negotiating all of the underlying rights necessary to begin researching.
This leads to inefficiencies and underutilization of intellectual resources. Across the
years, patent mavens traded stories of research deterred or research deferred due to patent
thickets.2 Innovation costs also may rise as rational enterprises factor in the risk that their
inventions will be plagued by suits from patent holders who emerge from the shadows of'
the patent thicket to claim a share as soon as the invention is successful.'
The sheer number of rights for any individual piece of research can be staggering.
The simple act of researching ways to genetically improve plants cultivated for food can
involve identifying and obtaining licenses to dozens of separate rights.4
Problems that flow from the number of patents in existence are exacerbated by the
difficulty of determining what an individual patent actually covers. The scope of rights
inherent in any given patent is not immediately clear upon inspection of the patent and is
Market Failing or Emerging, in EXPANDING TIlE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 223, 225
(Rochelle Cooper Drey Fuss et al. eds., 2001); NA'I IONAI, RFSFARCH COUNCIL , INLL ECI uAL, PROPERLY
RIGITS AND RESEARCI1 TOOLS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY (1997); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent
Thicket: (ross Licenses, Patent Poohs, and Standard-Setting, in INNOVATrION POI.ICY AND ITH ECONOMY 1,
1-2 (Adam Jaffe et al. eds., 2001), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf, Robin
Feldman, The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is It Patent Misuse?, 6 MfiNN. J.L. Scl. & TECH. 117,
123-25 (2004); Michael Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ('an Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons
in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property
Landscape of the Human (lenome, 310 SCL TNchE 239,239 40 (2004); cq COMMILriLF ON IN'FLI.LL-tCLTUA
PROPERLIY RIGHTS IN GF:NOMIC AND PROIEI N RFSFARCH AND INNOVA 11ON, NATIONAl, RFSFARCH
COUNCIL, REAPING TIlE BLNEFITS OF GLNOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCII: INTLLLECTUAL PROPLRTY
RL uHI's, INNOVATION, AND PURLIC HEAIIH (2006), available at
http://fermat.nap.edu/catalog/ 1487.html?onpi newsdocI 1172005 (concluding that intellectual property
restrictions rarely impose significant burdens on biomedical research but that there are reasons to be
apprehensive about their Future impact on scientific advances in this area); COMMI'IEF ON INLrELLECL AL
PROPERTY RTIGITS rN TIlE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, NATIONAL RESEARCII COUNCIL, A PATENT
SYSTFM FOR LHrie 21SL CFNURY (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) available at http://lab.nap.edu/nap-
cgi/discover.cgiterm a0%o20patent%20system&restric NAP (concluding that although the patent system
does not. require fundamental change, economic and legal changes, including those resulting from the sheer
volume of patents, are putting strains on the patent system); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, T0 PROMOTE
INNOVATION: TiE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at
http://www. ftc.gov/os/2003/1 0/innovationrpL.pdf (finding that poor patent quality and inadequate legal
standards and PTO procedures can hamper competition that would otherwise stinmulate innovation); Lori
Andrews et al., When Patents Threaten Science, 314 SCL FNCE 1395, 1395 96 (2006) (arguing that recent
judicial and administrative precedents raise questions about the delicate balance between a common body
of knowledge and the exclusive rights over scientific information embodied in a patent); Lita Nelsen, The
Rise of intellectual Property Protection in the American Universitv, 279 SCIENCE 1460, 1461 (1998)
(noting that the rise in partnership between academia and industry is increasing the inherent tension
between academia's goal of disseminating knowledge and industry's goal of controlling and keeping
confidential any intellectual property); see also Interview by Pamela Jones with Dan Ravicher, Executive
Director, Public Patent Foundations (Dec. 23, 2003), available at http://lwn.net/Articles/64378/ (referring
to "markets crippled by patent thickets").
2 See, etg., Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 225 (explaining that scientists must wait months or years as their
institutions wade through licensing agreements to gain access to research tools); Nelson, supra note 1, at
1461 (noting research dclays at univcrsitics).
-'See, ag., John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L. J. 435, 477 (2004); R. Polk Wagner &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Patent Portfblios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2005).
4 See CAMBIA BIOS Initiative: Biological Innovation for Open Society (Mar. 29, 2004) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
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likely to emerge only after extended litigation. For example, claim construction is the
term used in patent law for the process o l'determining what a patent actually claims. The
indeterminacy of claim construction in the modern courts is well-documnented.5 Even
when construction of the claims has been resolved, the question of whether those claims
will be interpreted to encompass the activity of the accused infringer, either directly or
through the doctrine of equivalents, is a complex and difficult one. It can be hard to
predict at the start of litigation, let alone in the initial phases of a research project,
whether an activity will be judged to fiall within the sphere of a particular patent.
Despite these concerns, a growing body of commentary argues that patent thickets
are not a problem in modern industries. Such commentary suggests that either patent
thickets do not exist, or if they do, patent thickets do not interfere with the progress of
research. In particular, two widely-cited empirical studies by John Walsh and his
colleagues conclude that, although the number of patents on research tools has increased
dramatically, drug discovery has not been substantially harmed. IJsing voluntary
surveys, the authors conclude that research is not impeded in the majority of cases
because patent holders can cope through strategies including inventing around patented
technology, obtaining licenses, or simply ignoring the existence of patent rights with the
expectation that patent holders will not come after them. ' The studies are cited as evidence
that the dreaded patent thicket is no more than an illusion. They have also been criticized for
using subjective data and for relying on a small pool.7
5 See, e.g., Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS
& CLARK L. R":v. 177, 177 (2005) (arguing that claim construction jurisprudence is in disarray and noting
that the Federal Circuit reverses trial court claim construction decisions at a worryingly high rate);
Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. Rrv. 231, 231 33 (2005) (documenting a concern among the bench and bar that the Federal
Circuit's de novo review of district court claim construction decisions and lack of guidance have caused
considerable unpredictability); see also Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuits Claim
Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY LECR. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court
Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8-10 (2001); R. Polk Wagner & Lee
Pcthcrbridgc, /s the Federal (ircuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of.htdicial Per/brmance 152
U. PA. L. REV 1105 (2004); Andrew T. Zidel, Patent Claim Construction in the Trial Courts: A Study
Showing the Need/br (lear Guidanceftom the Federal Circuit, 33 SF, TON HAl.I, L. RFiv. 711 (2003). But
see Jeffrey Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, IndeterminacY and Interpretation at the Federal
Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1027, 1094 (2007) (arguing that despite the nearly seamless consensus of
problems related to de novo review of patent claim construction, it is the indeterminacy of patent law,
rather than the application of patent law by the district courts or the Federal Circuit's review of the district
courts, that is responsible for the current circumstances of patent litigation).
6 See John P. Walsh ct al., Viewfiom the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCI N(:Ft 2002,
2002 (2005); John P. Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021, 1021 (2003);
see also John P. Walsh et al., Efects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in
PATENTS IN TIlE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 340 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen Merrill eds.,
2003).
'See F. Scott K ieft, IP Transactions: On the Theory & Practice of Commercializing Innovation, 42
Hous. L. REv. 727, 752 (2005) (noting the limitations of the Walsh study due to the small sample set of
only seventy interviews with IP attorneys, business managers, and scientists from ten pharmaceutical firms
and Fifteen biotech finns, as well as university researchers and technology transfer officers fron six
universities, patent lawyers, and government and trade association personnel); Paul A. David, The
Economic Logic of"Open Science" and the Balance Between Private Property Rights and the Public
Domain in Scientific Data and Information: A Primer 13 16 (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Pol'y Res., SIPPR
Discussion Paper No. 02-30, 2003), available at http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdt/O2-30.pdf (criticizing
the value of the earlier Walsh study); Yann Joly, Open Source Approaches in Biotechnology: Utopia
Revisited, 59 ME. L. REV. 385, 397 (2007) (noting that the Walsh study authors themselves recognized an
important limitation to their study design concerning the difficulty of measuring the extent to which
[ 200 8
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If patent thickets exist, the concern is that they will substantially impair research
and development because the tools oF invention cannot flow freely through the research
and development community. Similar charges have been made about the flow of
information among researchers, particularly at academic institutions. With the passage of
the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980,8 Congress granted universities the right to elect ownership of
inventions made with federal funds and encouraged them to participate in licensing and
commercialization of those inventions. The Act was intended to bring to the public the
benefits of' federal research dollars by giving universities an incentive to patent and
commercialize those products. Prior to passage of the Act, legislators were concerned
that for a variety of reasons, the government had proved ineffective as a shepherd of the
inventions created with federal research dollars.
Bayh-Dole has been a wild success when analyzed in terms of the number of
patents granted to universities and the number of products created. Looking back ol the
first twenty years oF' Bayh-Dole, The Council on Government Relations reported that
academic institutions had filed tens of thousands of patents which had led to the creation
of more than 1000 products actually on the market. In addition, 2200 new companies
were formed based on licensing of university patents. Another study showed that the
number of patents granted to universities each year jumped from 264 in 1974 to 3200 in
2001.' Patent licensing brought $959,000,000 to universities in 2002 alone, although
much of the revenue went to about a dozen research universities.10
Concerns have surfaced across time that, among other problems, the partnership
between government, industry, and academia may have the unintended consequence of
impeding the flow of information among researchers. Industry cosponsors of research
may delay or suppress the results of data.'' Researchers may be reluctant to publish data
until patent rights are secure. Moreover, researchers have complained that copyright mad
cost restrictions in the academic publishing industry hamper the use of published
information for teaching and research. These probtems play out in the field of copyright
law as well as patent law.
The rhetoric concerning research bottlenecks is particularly heated these days
because of dramatic changes underway in patent law. Congress continues to debate a
massive bill that would make substantial changes in patent statutes, including changing
damage calculations, creating a post-grant opposition proceeding, shifting to a first-to-file
system, and placing limitations on patent venue.2 Although receiving less serious
consideration, another bill would ban patenting of a "nucleotide sequence, or its functions
or correlations, or the naturally occurring products it specifies."' The latter bill has been
projects were not started or had been redirected because of patent concerns).
" See The Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517 (1980) [hereinafter Bayh-
Dole Act].
' JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC: TnE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 70
(2005).
I1d at 169.
See, e.g., Charles Cathey, The Bayh-Dole Act and the Development of Organizations like Stevens
Institute for Technology Commercialization and Alf ed E. Mann Institute jbr Biomedical Engineering at
USC 4 6 (2008) (unpublished paper on file with author) (detailing publication delays and other troubling
influences exerted by conunercial entities on university research).
2 See Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, I.R. 1908,
1 10th Cong. (2007).
13 See Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong. (2007).
Vol. 7:l11
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supported in the popular press with dramatic statements such as "YOJ, or someone you
love, may die because of a gene patent."' 4 If passed, the bill could have a sweeping
impact on the bioteclmology industry.
Case law also is evolving quickly. The Supreme Court has reviewed an unusually
high number of patent cases in the last few terms. The decisions generally have narrowed
patent rights or made it more difficult to obtain patents. "5 Moreover, a battle rages in the
courts concerning invalidation of the Patent and Trademark Office's extensive new rules
on continuation o 'patent applications. '
Research bottlenecks, or lack thereof, are invoked either in support of such changes
or in opposition to them.' 7 It is difficult to have a rational discussion when so much
seems to be at stake. Stepping back from the rhetoric a bit, this Article offers a different
approach to the question of whether research bottlenecks, such as patent thickets, exist
and whether they have an effect on modern markets. Given the complex nature of the
patent landscape, it is challenging to identify in a robust manner the extent to which
patent thickets may, or may not, exist. Nonetheless, one can sometimes indirectly
observe effects, even if one cannot directly measure the extent of a phenomenon. With
these concerns in mind, the Article describes three approaches appearing in modern
patent markets that are directed at mitigating the effects of patent thickets. These
approaches can be described as Open Source, Open Access, and Open Transfer.
As a general matter, markets tend to respond to real problems. There are costs
associated with shifting market positions, and one would ordinarily expect to see an
avoidance of those costs if the expenditures were not necessary. Information distortions
certainly can get in the way. In other words, it is possible that if people believe patent
thickets exist they may engage in behaviors to avoid the effects, even if the perception is
inaccurate. In addition, the analysis is complicated by the fact that utiversities are key
players in the market for patent research. Universities play a dual role as both
commercial actors reaping tremendous rewards from capitalization of their patented
inventions and educational institutions viewing themselves as keepers of the intellectual
14 Michael Crichton, Op-Ed., Patenting Lift, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 2007, at A2; see also Christopher M.
Holman, The Impact ojHum an Gene Patents on Innovation and Access: A Survey ojHum an Gene Patent
Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295 (2007) (discussing and opposing the bill).
x5ce, e.g., Ill. Toolworks Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (finding no presumption of market
power for patent holders in antitrust actions). Other patent cases that were granted writ o certiorari by the
Supreme Court include Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) (limiting extraterritorial
reach of patent protection); KSR ht'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (strengthening the
nonobviousness standard for obtaining a patent); MedImmune v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007)
(granting standing to licensees to challenge validity of patents); eBay, Inc. v. Merchxchange, L.L.C., 547
U.S. 388 (2006) (rejecting rule that patent infringement should always be enjoined); Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (cert. dismissed, improvidently granted with
dissenting opinion) (considering whether a medical correlation is patentable); Merck KGaA v. Integra
LifeSciences 1, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (concerning scope of research exemption to patent infringement
for research related to government submissions).
16 See Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 2008) (invalidating continuation rules).
" Compare Ann Mills & Patti Tereskerz, Proposed Patent Rejdbr Legislation: Limitations of Empirical
Data Used to ln/brm the Public Policy Debate (Biotechnology Industry Organisation White Paper, Jan. 30,
2008), available at http://bio.org/ip/domestic/UVA Limitations of Empirical Data.pdf (opposing patent
reform legislation) [hereinafter BIO White Paper] with NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note I
(proposing patent rcform legislation) andCoMMIrI-I- (ON [N'I F-.I SCTUAI PROPFRTY RIOHI's IN THF
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, supra note I (same) and FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note I
(same).
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flame. For example, a group of University Tech Transfer officers recently put forward a
white paper on points that their Fellow oliccrs should consider in licensing university
technology. The paper noted universities must "be mindful of their primary mission to
use patents to promote technology development for the benefit of society. " 1 The dual
role may also affect their behaviors in what we would describe as the patent market.
Nevertheless, the costs of creating alternative market pathways should be a
deterrent, if the need for alternative pathways is less than such costs. Moreover, as a
general matter, the actual contours of market transactions should be a more reliable
indicator of what is happening in those markets than any academic speculation.
Thus, although currently one may not be able to prove anything definitive about the
extent of bottlenecks and thickets, the creation of avoidance behaviors may be useful in
confirming their existence. Most important, market responses may give us an indication
of where the problems lie and may suggests paths that the law should encourage-or at
least not sti lie.
In short, from our vantage point, we may not be able to see or to measure the depth
of the thickets. We can, however, observe the altered growth patterns that give us some
indication of where the problems lie.
1. OPEN TRANSFER
One of the great shocks to the academic system in recent years was the Federal
Circuit's decision in Madey v. Duke. 9 Professor Madey was a tenured research professor
in the physics department at Duke University and the sole owner of two patents in use at
Duke's free electron laser lab. After a falling out with University officials, the University
removed Madey as director of the lab, and Madey resigned. The lab continued to use the
lab equipment, however, and Madey sued for infringement. Among other defenses, Duke
claimed that any activity in the lab was covered by the experimental use exception. The
experimental use exception is a common law creation that can be traced back to cases in
the 1800s.20
Although the trial court had upheld the University's experimental use defense, the
Federal Circuit reversed, keeping faithful to a formulation from the early cases in which
the exception is available only for activities having the sole purpose of gratifying a
philosophical taste, satisfying curiosity, or amusement. 21 Most important, the Federal
Circuit suggested that universities would have a very difficult time ever asserting the
experimental use defense. The court speciFically noted that the experimental use
exception does not apply when an entity is engaged in commercial activity that furthers
its legitimate business objectives.2 According to the Federal Circuit, a university's
legitimate business ob jectives include educating and enlightening students and faculty, as
well as increasing the status of the university, luring lucrative rescareh granits, and
" In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University Technology 6 (March 6, 2007)
(on ile with author) [hercinafler University White Paper].
"' 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
20 Janice M. Muellcr, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent
Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASh. L. Rcv. 1, 19 (2001).
" Id at 1361 (noting that the experimental use defense is quite narrow and is limited to actions
performed "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity or for strictly philosophical inquiry").
22 Id at 1362.
Vol. 7:l11
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attracting faculty and students.2" This definition effectively eliminates any research
exception for universities.
Prior to the Madey decision, academic researchers routinely ignored patent rights in
conducting their teaching and experiments. 4  Although they may have comforted
themselves with thoughts of a research exception, Madey made it clear that no such
exemption exists. Without any hope of asserting a research exception, university
researchers in theory would be forced to navigate the maze of patent licensing or face
infiringement suits. An inlormal poll of1 research institutions at a meeting in 2002
revealed that a number of institutions were receiving more infringement notification
letters in the wake of the Madey decision.25 Other reports suggested that academic
researchers were continuing to ignore patent rights with the tacit acquiescence of patent
holders,26 a decidedly risky strategy for an institution.
Academic institutions, however, have not simply waited to see whether the tide will
shift and patent holders will start suing [or infringement. Rather, the institutions have
attempted to alter the market rights, to the extent possible, through their technology
transfer agreements. For example, a group of prominent research universities issued a
white paper outlining nine important issues for universities to consider in technology
transfer agreements. 27 The group includes Cal-Tech, Cornell, Harvard, MI', Stanford,
University of California, Uiniversity of Illinois, University of Washington, Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation, Yale, and The Association of American Medical
Colleges."
In particular, the University 'White Paper recommends that universities reserve the
right to practice licensed inventions.
Universities should consider reserving rights in all fields of use, even if the
invention is licensed exclusively to a commercial entity, for themselves and other
non-profit and governmental organizations: to practice inventions and to use
associated information and data for research and educational purposes, including
research sponsored by commercial entities; and to transfer tangible research
materials (e.g., biological materials and chemical compounds) and intangible
materials (e.g., computer software, databases and know-how) to others in the
non-profit and govcrnmental sectors.29
2I d.
24 The Walsh surveys were conducted as the Madccy decision was making its way through the courts.
The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded in 2002, and the district court rendered its final opinion in
2004. Id; Mad ey v. Duke 336 F. Supp. 2d 583 (M.D.N.C. 2004). The Walsh studies were published in
2003 and 2005. See the studies cited, suyra note 6. Although some commentators have speculated that
university researchers were unaware of the Madev decision in its immediate aftermath and that researchers
and private industry would alter their behavior across time, others dispute this interpretation. See BIO
White Paper, sujra note 17, at 22 (noting the controversy and citing the FTC, NAS, NCR and Walsh
reports, supra notes 1 and 6, as disputing the notion that lack of anti-commons effect can be attributed to
lack of knowledge about Madey).
25 See RIO White Paper, supra note 17, at 22.
26 See Walsh studies, supra note 6.
2' University White Paper, supra note 18.
2 Id at 1.
9 Id at 2.
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In other words, rights should be reserved, not just for the university itself, but on behalf
ol'all non-proit and governmental organizations. We call such provisions Open Transfler
Agreements.
The University White Paper notes further that clear articulation of the reserved
rights is critical and offers examples of retained rights clauses.30 One of the examples in
the University White Paper comes from license agreements used by Stanford University's
Office of Technology Transfer." The provision reserves use rights "for any non-profit
purpose, including sponsored research and collaborations." 2
A Stanford technology transfer officer noted that the university previously used a
clause that retained the right to use technology for "non-commercial purposes."33 While
the University believed that industry-sponsored research at the university should be
included in the notion of "non-commercial" purposes, some companies disagreed. 4
Thus, Stanford moved to more explicit language. 5 The dispute highlights the difficulty
of' defining what constitutes non-commercial or academic research, particularly in an
environment in which academic and commercial entities collaborate.
The University White Paper also mentions this issue, noting the importance of
defining the notion of non-commercial purposes. The commentary in the paper explains
that "to address the Madey issue in recent agreements, we have attempted to make clear
that . . . activities held under Madey to be the 'business' activities of universities are
within the scope of our reserved rights."16  The commentary provides an example o a
definitional clause to clarity the meaning of non-commercial purposes. 7
3' Id at 2, 10-12.
A Id at 10; F-mail fron Katherine Ku, Stanford University Office of Technology Transfer (Nov. 13,
2007) (on file with author).
32 University White Paper, supra note 18, at 10. The full provision reads:
Institution retains the right, on behalf of itself and all other non-profit academic research
institutions, to practice the Licensed Patent and use Technology for any non-profit purpose,
including sponsored research and collaborations. Licensee agrees that, notwithstanding any other
provision of this Agreement, it has no right to enforce the Licensed Patent against any such
institution. Institution and any such other institution has the right to publish any information
included in the Technology or a Licensed Patent.
B Ku E-mail, supra note 3 1.
11 See i.L
16 University White Paper, supra note 18, at 1.
17 "Non-commercial Research Purposes" means:
Use or practice of Licensed Patent Rights for academic research and other not-for-profit or
scholarly purposes which are undertaken at a non-profit or governmental institution that does not
involve the production or manufacture of products for sale or the performance of services for a
fee. Without limiting the foregoing: (i) "academic research and other not-for-profit or scholarly
purposes" includes, in non-limiting fashion, research that leads, or may lead, to patentable or
unpatentable inventions that may be licensed or otherwise transferred, either directly or indirectly,
to third parties; and (ii) neither (A) receipt of license revenues on account of such inventions or
receipt of reimbursements for the costs of preparation and shipping of samples of materials
provided to third parties as a professional courtesy, in response to post-publication requests or
otherwise in accordance with academic custom nor (B) receipt of funding to cover the direct
and/or indirect costs of research, shall constitute sale of products or performance of service for a
fee.
University White Paper, supra note 18, at 11.
Vol. 7:l11
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In conversations with the authors of this Article, one university technology transfer
officer commented that companies are not happy about including the Open Transfler
language in their agreements, but that the University takes the position that failure to
include the language is a deal-killer. Interestingly, the University White Paper and
examples of such clauses in university technology transfer agreements do not seem to
have made their way into the academic literature yet, although they have been operative
for several years. The February 2008 Biotech Industry Organization (BIO) White Paper
notes that the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) planned in
2002 to monitor Lriversities' experiences with the research exception, but that BIO is
unaware of any follow-up by the AAAS or other organizations.3"
In general, Open Transfer clauses are designed to create a market space of free
experimentation that will be available for all non-profit research institutions. The attempt
is less than perfect in its coverage. The clauses will apply only to technology created by
universities themselves, not to the vast amount of technology created in the private
sector, and they will only apply to technology that is licensed going forward. In addition,
the University White Paper suggests only issues to consider and does not bind any of its
signatories. Finally, although the signatories represent many of the major players in the
fields of scientific research, they do not represent all of them. Thus, to the extent that a
patent thicket exists, the Open Transfer initiative offers only a partial solution.
Nevertheless, Open Transfer is a creative attempt to mitigate difliculties with access to
research rights, and one that indicates the existence of a significant problem for research
universities.
II. OPEN SOURCE BIOTECHNOLOGY
The notion of open source systems developed first in the world of information
technology and computer software through efforts by programming leaders such as
Richard Stailman. Understanding so-called Open Source Biotechnology requires some
understanding of its predecessor in the software world.
Software developers write software in a variety of programming languages, all
designed to make it easier for humans to tell computers what to do as effectively as
possible. This human-comprehensible format is known as "source code" and is relatively
easy for a trained programmer to use and understand.39 Computers, on the other hand,
rely on "object code," produced by a computer program known as a "compiler," which
takes hunan-friendly source code and produces machine-comprehensible object code."
With access to the source code, programmers can change the software, what it does, how
it looks, and how it operates. They can customize it, repackage it, change its name, or do
almost anything they wish.
For exactly this reason, most companies that sell software have relied on a "closed-
source" or proprietary software development and distribution model.4  Source code
written by programmers is kept secret, and is kept under tight control by the companies
See H1O White Paper, supra note 17, at 22.
'9 See Christian 1I. Nadan, Open Source Licensing: Virus or birtue?, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 349,
350 51 (2002).
40 MARK A. LEMIeFY El' Al., SOF'IWARF AND INIERNFV LAW 25 (3rd ed. 2000)_
41 Nadan, supra note 39, at 350- 51.
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that own it.42 In addition to keeping the source code secret, proprietary software makers
Usually release their object code under tight licensing restrictions that supplement
technical protections, as well as patent and copyright restrictions, with additional
contractual protections restricting end users rights to modify, copy or distribute the
software. 3
The Open Source Software movement, 44 on the other hand, utilizes a different
model in which source code is freely distributed along with object code.45  To Open
Source Software advocates, "liee" relers to "liberty, not price. "' A common and
colorful analogy in the Open Source Software movement is that free software is "'free' as
in 'free speech,' not as in 'free beer.' ' 7 Essentially, to be a true Open Source license, a
licensee must be permitted to at any time and for any purpose copy, change, and
distribute the source code of the software. 41 Typically, Open Source Software
development is highly collaborative, with frequent, iterative releases that fix bugs and
introduce changes much more rapidly than traditional proprietary software
development.4 ' A group of developers often operate loosely as project managers and
guide the incorporation of new code written by many others into the core software. 0
This peer-production model allows for effective utilization of available materials more
efficiently than for individuals operating in a traditional market approach.5 ' A broad goal
of Open Source is to foster the reuse of available resources instead of a constant necessity
to "reinvent the wheel."52
While critics have attacked Open Source as undennining copyright, hampering
innovation, and providing a limited public good,; many companies have nevertheless
adopted Open Source as a key part of their business strategy, either as contributors to
Open Source development or as users of Open Source products.5 4  Red Hat, Inc., for
42 Id at 351 52. See also Mathias Strasser, A New Paradigm in intelleciual Propery Law?: 7he Case
Against Open Source, 2001 STAN. TECI. L. REV. 4, 10 (2001).
41 See Joseph Scon Miller, Allchin 's Folly: Exploding Some Myths About Open Source Sojh'ware, 20
CAM)ozo AR I'S & ENI. L... 491, 496 (2002).
11 For detailed discussions of the open source software movement, see generally RICHARD STALLMAN,
FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD STALLMAN (Joshua Gay ed., 2002).
41 Id. at 16.
46 GNU Project, The Free Software Definition, http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html (last visited
Nov. 6, 2008).
47 id
18 See Larry Rosen et al., Live from Silicon Palley, Views (?f Open Source Practitioners, in LFUAl
ISSUES RELATING TO FREE AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 37, 39 (B. Fitzgerald & G. Basset eds., 2003).
See also J.T. Westermeier, Open Source Soff4,are, 801 Pl./PiAr 421,428 (2004).49 See Eric S. Raymond, The Revenge of the Hackers, in OPEN SOURCFS: VOICES FROM THF OPFN
SotuRcE REVOLUTION (Chris DiBona et al. eds., 1999); see also ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL
AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY
(2 1 ).
Nadan, supra note 39, at 353.
SI See Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or Linux and the Nature (f he hirm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 376
77 (2002) ("Transaction costs associated with property and contract limit the access of people to each other,
to resources, and to projects when production is organized on a market or firm model, but not when it is
organized on a peer production model.").
2 Raymond, supra note 49.
See, e.g., Strasser, supra note 42.
See, e.g., P.G. Capek et al., A History of lBM's Open-Source Involvement and Strategy, 44 IBM SYS.
J. 249 (2005), available at http://www.research.ibm.com/joumal/s j/442/capek.pdf.
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example, provides software support services and bundles of the Linux operating system,
which is developed under an Open Source model. 5  Red Hat does not control linux
development, but it both contributes to and profits from it.5" In fact, Red Hat has
generated enough business to "win the approval of financial markets and maintain
[significant] market capitalization."57
Open Source Bioteclmnology tries to borrow from elements of the Open Source
Software movement, orienting those elements around the scientific development of
biotechnology. It is described using different names, including Open Source
Biotechnology, recognizing its roots in Open Source Software, and Open Science,
recognizing the elements that differ from the computer world. 8
There are two main divisions within the broad category of Open Source
Biotechnology. The first category primarily involves bioinformatics-the application of
computer software and methodologies to solve biological problems. With its focus on
software, this category is a direct beneficiary of Open Source Software and Open Source
approaches. Three examples of Open Source in the bioinformatics world are BioPerl,
BioJava, and BioPython. All of them are now organized together under the auspices of
the Open Bioinformatics Foundation.:
These projects all make their work available under standard Open Source licenses,
such as the GNU Lesser General Public License, version 2. L. According to Lincoln
Stein, a researcher at the Cold Springs Harbor Laboratory who works with the human
genome project, BioPerl resources "saved the human genome project" by allowing the
development of quick and useful tools to facilitate the interchange of data amongst
laboratories who kept their research in dissimilar formats.' The Bioinformatics
Organization takes an even broader approach to encouraging collaboration and
participation in bioinformatics development, maintaining computational resources and
promoting open access to materials and methods for bioinformatics research and
education throughout the world. 2
The second category of Open Source Biotechnology is much broader, and is more
loosely connected with the approaches used by Open Source Software. As the subjects of
the projects move further from the software interflace, they may be better described as
"Open Science." Although difficult to characterize as a whole, these Open Science
" See David McGowan, Legal Implications oJ Open-Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 241, 242-43
(2001).
56 Id at 242.
. See id
58 Compare Lee Pcthcrbridgc, Road Map to Revolution: Patent Based Open Science, 59 M. L. RF-v.
339 (2007) with Robin C. Feldman, The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is It Patent Misuse?, 6
MINN J. I.. Sc'. & TCH. 117 (2004) and David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin's Genome or Coase and Open
Source Biotechnology, 18 HARv. J.L. & TECI. 167, 198-201 (2004). See also Katherine M. Nolan-
Stevaux, Open Source Biology: A Means to Address the Access & Research Gaps?, 23 SANTA CLARA
COMPIITER & HIGH TCH. L.J. 271 (2007) (using the term Open Source Biology).
'9 See Open Bioinformatics Foundation, http://www.open-bio.org (last visited Nov. 6, 2008).
60 ee, e.g., BioJava Project, http://www.biojava.org (last visited Nov. 6, 2008); see also GNU Lesser
General Public License, version 2.1, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/lgpl-2. l.html (last visited
Nov. 6, 2008).
61 Lincoln Stein, How Perl Saved the Human Genome Project, 'IHE PERL JOURNAL (Sept. 1996),
available at http://www.bioperl.org/wiki/ owPerl saved human genome.
" See Bioinformatics Organization, http://wiki.bioinformatics.org/BioinformaticsOrganization (last
visited Nov. 6, 2008).
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projects try to ensure that the biotechnology tools required for research and innovation
are openly available.6 1  Some are aimed at solving problems in underserved
Colrnnities,64 given that the non-profit researchers who focus on those communities
may not have the financial capacity to navigate the maze of patent rights and licensing
necessary to engage in the targeted research. Many of the projects cite cutting through
patent thickets as an important goal.
Open Science Projects share some characteristics with their Open Software
predecessors. Open Science tends to involve collaborative projects that pool the work of
many participants and makes advances available to a broad community. Most important,
a number of Open Science projects copied the Open Source Software licensing approach,
using the power of the patent system to ensure that the core technology of the proiect and
any innovations remain openly available. 5 For these projects, participants agree to either
grant licenses or enforce their rights in a way that maintains the availability of the
inventions and improvements in the luture.
Open Science projects differ significantly, however, from Open Source Software
projects. Open Source Software allows a broad range of researchers to see information
that remains hidden in the program. The Open Science world is quite different.
Although information flow may be hampered if individuals choose not to patent their
research, much of Open Science is premised on patent rights, which presupposes that the
information has been revealed in a patent application. Such inlFormation will most likely
become public at some point. In addition, any individual with a computer and the proper
programming skills can participate in Open Source Software. In contrast, Open Science
projects may require the use of sophisticated laboratory equipment. Given the resources
required for such endeavors, participants are likely to be at large academic or
commercial research organizations, which complicates efforts to enroll participants and
shape their rights. Finally, the rights system underlying Open Source Software is
copyright, white the rights system underlying Open Science is patent. Differences
between these rights systems guarantee that the rights, licensing structures and
enforcenent potentials will differ."
Examples of Open Science include the HapMap Project, CAMBIA and the
Biological Innovation for Open Society Initiative (BiOS), and the Public Patent
Foundation.67 The IIapMap Project is a multi-country effort to identify and catalog
genetic differences in humans.6" The project, funded with both public and private funds,
started in 2002 and includes researchers from six countries. "9  HapMap's goal is a
specialized map of the human genome particularly containing information about cites in
6" See Feldman, supra note 1, at 118. For a more detailed description of the Open Source Biotechnology
projects introduced below, see id.
6 See, e.g., Stephen M. Maurer et al., Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is Open Souce an
Answer?, in BlOTECIINOLOGY: ESSAYS FROM ITS I IEARTLAND 33 (Lynn Yards ed. 2004) (advocating a
tropical disease initiative).
65 &eC id
66 Opderbeck, supra note 58, at 198 201.
7 For a more detailed description of these and other Open Science projects, see Feldman, supra note 1.
68 See About the HapMap, http://www.hapmap.org/thehapniap.html.en (last visited Nov. 6, 2008).
61 See News Release, National institutes of Health, National Human Genonie Research Institute,
International I lapMap Consortium Expands Mapping Effort (Feb. 7, 2005), available at
http://www.geiiome.gov/13014173.
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the human genome where the DNA sequences vary among individuals. These variations
are called single nucleotide polymorphisms, or SNPs.
Originally, HapMap users agreed to take certain steps to maintain the open
availability of information in the database. The click-wrap license stated that patents
filed for particular uses of SNPs in the database must be licensed on terms that would
maintain free access to the information in the database for other purposes.7 HapMap's
licensing strategy was short-lived. Among other reasons, the stringency of the license
terms prevented HapMap data from being incorporated into other public genomic
databases.7' In addition, developments in the scientific arena led HapMap to conclude
that the SNPs probably were not patentable.72 Data from the IlapMap project is now
completely available to the public.73
CAMBIA is another Open Science Project. CAMBIA, and its child project, the
BiOS Initiative, are focused on expanding access to biological research, especially for
disadvantaged communities.74 The goal is to increase democratic innovation through
"astute use of intellectual property informatics and analysis" and to allow for the
cooperative development of technology.75 In other words, BiOS tries to develop and
bundle groups of technologies that can be used for scientific research related to
underprivileged communities. The stated objective of the BiOS Initiative is "to create a
public-spirited and public-good based initiative with respect to biological innovations.""
BiOS has developed a system to increase understanding of patents and to foster "patent
transparency,"77 created licenses to foster open research,78 and created an online
community for biological innovation, known as "BioForge." 79
The Public Patent Foundation was yet another form of Open Science project.
Public Patent was aimed not specifically at underprivileged communities, but more
broadly at market areas hampered by so many patents that even those holding some of the
patents could not efficiently navigate the licensing. The Foundation hoped to establish
patent pools in which the technology would be openly available to other pool
participants. 80
Open Science systems have not always matched the initial expectations. The
HapMap Project has assembled a tremendous data base, but it has had to shilt from a
70 See Feldman, supra note 1, at 125-26.
71 News Release, National Institutes of Health, National Human Genome Research Institute,
International HapMap Consortium Widens Data Access, (Dec. 10, 2004, available at
littp://www.genome.gov/12514423; see also Opderbeck, supra note 58, at 198 201 (predicting other
problems with the I lapMap licensing approach).
7 International HapMap Consortium Widens Data Access, supra note 7 1.
71 See id.
74 See BiOS Initiative, http://www.bios.net/daisy/bios/about/3.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2008).
75 What Is BiOs?, http://www.bios.net/daisybios/gl/2442/24.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2008).
76 id
71 See The Patent Lens, http://www.patentlens,.netdaisy/patentlens/patentlenshtml (last visited Nov. 6,
2008).
78 See About BiOS Licenses and MTAs, http://www.bios.net/daisy/bios/licenses/398.html (last visited
Nov. 6, 2008).
71,See Bioforge: An Online Community for Biological Innovation,
http://www.biofo)rgc.net/forge/indcx.jspa (last visited Nov. 6, 2008).
"0 See Interview by Pamela Jones with Dan Ravicher, supra note 1; E-mail from Dan Ravicher,
Executive Director, Public Patent Foundation, to Robin Feldman, Assistant Professor of Law, University of
California Hastings College of the Law (Jan. 13, 2004, 11:34 PST) (on file with author).
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GNU-style licensing scheme to a system that places the data into the public domain.
Public Patent foundation has not moved Iorward with its pooling project and continues as
an advocacy group. 1 Nevertheless, Open Science initiatives continue in various forms
and with various degrees of progress.
III. OPEN ACCESS
Open Transfer and Open Source are attempts to allow the tools of invention to flow
more freely among researchers. Open Access is somewhat different. The goal of Open
Access is to allow information to flow more freely among researches, as well as to the
public at large.
For problems relating to the flow of information, copyright law, rather than patent,
is the vehicle through which barriers are erected. Nevertheless, the pace of" scientific
inventions, including those that are likely to become the subject of patents, may be
affected by impediments in the flow of information.
Such Open Access systems have developed in response to concerns that articles
published in scientific journals are too restricted in their availability. Academic
scientists, who must publish or perish, have no choice but to offer their papers to
scientific journals. The amount of scientific inlbrmation is staggering. Each year, 2.5
million articles are published in refereed journals, across all disciplines, languages and
nations." 2
The wealth of information available in those papers then becomes difficult to
access for a variety of reasons. The sheer number of articles creates a challenge to the
efficient flow of information in the scientific community. In addition, two barriers create
particular problems for information dissemination. The first problem is "price barriers,"
given that access to journals may require hefty subscriptions, licensing fees, or pay-per-
view fees. 3 The second is "permission barriers," given that restrictions on all uses
including research and teaching may be limited by copyright and by licensing
restrictions. 84 The prestige factor of existing journals, combined with the importance oI
prestige publication for a science career, serve as entry barriers for individual journals
that might compete on price and terms.
Individual efforts are difficult, but coordinated projects in the scientific community
have led to the development of Open Access systems for scientific research. The
scientific open-access movement began to gain momentum in 1998 through the efforts of
the Scholarly Publishing and Academic Resources Coalition. 5 The coalition's eflbrts led
to the founding of the Public Library of Science (PLoS), and the eventual launch in 2003
of a group of open-access journals, primarily focused on medicine and biology. 6 Other
notable open-access efforts include ArXiv, the Social Science Research Network,
" See About PUBPAT, http://www.pubpat.org/About.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2008) (describing the
current activities of the Foundation).
F' D-LI B MAGA/ANF (Mar. 2005), nailable at http://dlib.org/dlib/march05/03contents.htm I.3 See Peter Suber, Open Access Overview, http://www.earlham.cdiu/-petcrs/fos/overvicw.hiin (last
visited Nov. 6, 2008).
84 See id.
95 David W. Opderbeck, The Penuin 's Paradox: The Political Economy ojfInternational Intellectual
Propery and the Paradox of Open Intellectual Property Model, 18 Si AN. L. & Po,' v Ri-v. 101 (2007).
86 id
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Biomed Central, and Berkeley Electronic Press." These efforts are all informed by a
broader international movement towards open-access scholarship generally, including the
Budapest Open Access Initiative," the Bethesda Statement on Open Access Publishing,"9
and the Berlin Declaration on Open Access to Knowledge in the Sciences and
Humanities.9
One example of "open access" comes from the charter of the PLoS, which allows
"all users a free, irrevocable, worldwide, perpetual right of access to, and a license to
copy, use, distribute, transmit and display the work" and requires a "complete version of'
the work and all supplemental materials . .. [to be] deposited inmediately upon initial
publication in at least one online repository."9  This standard is also known as the
Creative Commons Attribution License (CCAL):92 "Under the CCAL, authors retain
ownership of the copyright for their article, but authors allow anyone to download, reuse,
reprint, modify, distribute, and/or copy articles in PLoS journals, so long as the original
authors and source are cited. No permission is required from the authors or the
publishers.""
Other funding organizations, such as the Howard Hughes Medical Institute mad the
Wellcome Trust, have also recently moved to require scientists to deposit such electronic
copies in a publicly-accessible repository.94
There are a range of approaches within the Open Access movement. Pure Open
Access would remove both price barriers and use barriers.95 Some systems, however,
provide variations on the theme, for example, removig price barriers but not perission
barriers." Such public availability is sometimes referred to as Public Access, rather than
Open Access.
It is important to understand that Open Access and Public Access are not the same
thing as placing an article into the public domain. Although some scholars advocate that
works generated by publicly financed research should enter the public domain and have
no rights attached,97 the Open Access movement and its Public Access cousin follow a
different concept. Like Open Source, they use the power of an Intellectual Property
regime, here copyright, to control the article once it is published in a way that ensures a
firee flow ofinlbrmation.
17 Chris Armbruster, Open Access in Social and Cultural Scien ce: Innovative Moves to Enhance Access,
Inclusion and Inpact in Scholarv Coininunication, 6 POL'Y Fu mURES IN EDUC. 424 (2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm'?abstract id849305.
98 Budapest Open Access Initiative (Feb. 14, 2002), http://www.soros.org/openaccess/read.shtni.
9 Bethesda Statement on Open Access Publishing (June 20, 2003),
http://www.,earlham.edu/-peters/fos/bethesda.hm.
"' Berlin Declaration on Open Access to Knowledge in the Sciences and Humanities (Oct. 22, 2003),
http://www.zin.mpg.dce/opcnacccss-bcrl in/berlindcclaration.htni .
91 PoS Definition of Open Access, http://www.plos.org/oa/definition.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2008).
92 Creative Commons Legal Code, http://creativecommons.org/Iicenses/by/2.5/legalcode (last visited
Nov. 6, 2008).
PLos Medicine, Open-Access License No Permission Required,
http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/liccnsc.php (last visited Nov. 6, 20(18).
91 Ted Agres, Open Access Opening Wider, TH SCIENrIS I, Jlly 5, 2(1(17, available at http://www.lhe-
scientist.com/news/display/53366/.
!) Suber, supra note 83.
96 i.
'7 See Samuel Trosow, Copyright ProtectionJbr Federally Funded Research: Necessary Incentive or
Double Subsidy?, 22 CARDOzo ARTS & FNI. 1J. 613 (2004).
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What is most interesting about the Open Access movement is that the Federal
Government, taking the lead from private organizations, has joined the eflbrt. With Open
Access, legal policy has, at least to some extent, followed the path blazed by participants
in the relevant industry.
Specifically, in recently-passed legislation, Congress has directed the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) to require that research papers developed as a result of NIH
funding should be made publicly available through PubMed Central. Similar to the
contractual provisions that universities are using in Open Transfer, the process will be
accomplished through contractual language in publishing contracts. Earlier legislation
had spawned NIhI provisions requesting that researchers who receive NII funding
voluntarily submit final versions of manuscripts accepted for publication for inclusion in
a public database. Only four percent of eligible articles were submitted to the database
under that language. "
The NIH Open Access system is a compromise. It is less open than a pure Open
Access standard and somewhat less open than even a true Public Access system. NIH
primarily addresses price barriers (subscription fees, for example), not permission
barriers (licensing restrictions and other aspects of copyright). In addition, public access
can be delayed up to twelve months, giving publishers some time to earn a return on
initial publication of the information."
Unlike the licensing used by the PLoS, the NIH imposes no requirement that the
author or copyright owner change or modify the copyright of the work deposited with
PubMed Central, except that a NIhI-funded author must reserve the right to deposit the
article for viewing by the public. With this limited reserved access, the public can read
the full-text article, cite to it, and exercise general "fair use" exceptions to copyright, but
cannot, for example, print the article out and make photocopies of it for an entire class, as
would be permissible under most open-access approaches.
To accomplish this, the NIH asks authors to insert language such as the following
into the copyright agreements authors sign with publishers: "Journal acknowledges that
Author retains the right to provide a copy of the final peer-reviewed manuscript to NIH
upon acceptance For Journal publication, or thereafter, Ibr public archiving in PubMed
Central as soon as possible but no later than twelve months after publication by
Journal."'1
" See Enhanced Public Access to NIH Research Information, 69 Fed. Reg. 56,074 (Sept. 17, 2004),
available at http://grants.nili.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT[1-OD-04-064.html; NATE INST. OF HEALTH,
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., REPORT ON THE NIH PUBLIc ACCESS POLICY (2006); see also
Opderbeck, supra note 85, at 111 14, 11 19 (describing the history of the voluntary provision and its lack
of success).
"' The Consolidated Appropriations Act 2008, Pub.L. No. 110-161, Div. G, Title I1, § 218, reads as
follows:
The Director of the National Institutes of Health shall require that all investigators funded by the
Nil I submit or have submitted for them to the National Library of Medicine's PubMed Central
an electronic version of their final, peer-reviewed manuscripts upon acceptance for publication,
to be made publicly available no later than 12 months after the official date of publication:
Provided, That the NIH shall implement the public access policy in a manner consistent with
copyright law.
National Institutes of Ilealth Public Access, Public Access Frequently Asked Questions,
http://publicaccess.nih.gov/FAQ.htmtc2 (last visited Nov. 6, 2008).
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The goal is to provide the public the ability to access federally-funded research
after a reasonable period without expensive subscription fees and without fundamentally
altering the economics of the publishing industry. Congress sought to: (1) allow
publishers to financially benefit from public investment, while encouraging them to keep
investing in improved publishing methods; and (2) lower the costs of public access and
quicken the pace at which the public is allowed to directly benefit from federal research
spending. "'
Before passage of' the bill, the Bush Administration had identified three areas of'
concern with legislation making public access mandatory for NIH-fLided research,
although the Administration indicated that these concerns should be balanced against "the
benefit of public access to taxpayer supported research."'0 2  Those areas were: (1) the
impact on scientific research publishing, (2) the impact on scientific peer review, and (3)
"the United States' longstanding leadership in upholding strong standards of protection
for intellectual property." 
3
The traditional publishing industry argues that Public Access will increase their
costs and make them less profitable. This, they argue, will increase the costs of access to
their journals, reduce innovation in the publishing realm, and hamper the business of
scientific publishing, the free market, and the progress of science. Critics of the even
broader approach taken by Open Access initiatives believe Open Access undermines the
traditional scienti lie publishing model even more than the limited public access mandated
by the 10th Congress. As the congressional mandate moves forward, it will be
interesting to see whether the balance is appropriate or whether problems predicted by the
publishing industry materialize.
Although much more limited than Open Access advocates would like, the
congressional/NIH program is remarkable in several ways. First, it marks a legislative
effort to follow private voluntary initiatives that attempt to increase the flow of research
information. More important, the effort uses the NIH and the massive power of its
federal funding to encourage terms that will promote greater exchanges in the scientific
community. To the extent that coordinated action may be important tor easing research
" Sec ,'he Public Access Policy of the National Institutes of Health: Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
the Internet, and Intel]. Prop. of the II. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 6-7 (2008) (statement of Elias
A. Zerhouni, Director, National Institutes oF Health), available at
http://judiciaty.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Zerhouni0809l l.pdf; Hearing on H.R 6845 Before the Subconmn.
on Courts, the Internet, and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, I 10th Cong. 3 7 (2008)
(statement of Heather Daltiero Joseph on behalf of Scholarly Publishing and Academic Resources
Coalition, Alliance for Taxpayer Access, and Association of Research Libraries), available at
http://judiciary.housc.gov/hearings/pdf/.osphX0911.pdfl See also NI H PUmi Ii ACCFSS WORKING (iROIJI'
OF TIE NLM BOARD OF REGENTS MEETING SUMMARY (2005), available at
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/od/bor/PublicAccessWG-11-15-05.pdf (meeting on Nov. 15, 2005, discussing
what recommendations the NIH should make to Congress in regards to public access); Lila Guterman,
Advocates of Open Access Hope to Strengthen the NIH's Policy on Making Research Results Available
Online, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., May 19, 2006.
02 See Mark Graczynski & Lynn Moses, Open Access Publishing-Panacea or Trojan Horse?, 1 MED.
Sci. MONITOR 1, 1-3 (2004) (criticizing the idea that taxpayer funding should result in either public or open
access).
1(' OFFICE OF MGMT. & BU[DGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION POLICY, (Oct. 17, 2007), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/1I10-1/s1710sap-s.pdf.
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bottlenecks, the NIH certainly sits at the center of American scientific research activity, a
position that provides the opportunity for significant coordination.
This is not the first time the NIH has used its power to encourage licensing terms
that it believes will be in the public interest. For example, NIII guidelines for grant
recipients who use or develop research tools discourage recipients from engaging in
certain types of licensing provisions, on the grounds that such royalties lead to
unreasonable restraints on publication and academic freedom as well as impeding
scientific progress.0 4 In addition, the NIH has been quite explicit in expressing its hope
that influencing NIH fitnding recipients will encourage other organizations to adopt
similar policies."0 5 Binding requirements like the recently enacted publication provisions
have a much greater impact than guidelines, however, even when those guidelines are
accompanied by soaring language.
IV. OBSERVATIONS
Open Source, Open Access, and Open Transfer indicate ways that those in the
markets for scientific research have tried to develop strategies to address research
bottlenecks. These approaches suggest that relevant market participants perceive
impediments to their activities and are sul'ficiently motivated to develop avoidance
behaviors.
The implications one can draw from the observations above are quite modest. The
observations cannot resolve whether damage calculations should be apportioned
differently nor can they resolve any of the other hotly contested issues in the pending
patent reform legislation. Nor can they suggest whether the pending massive
continuation rules should be voided or left to stand. In general, as academics, we would
be wise to avoid sweeping generalizations from modest observations as well as the
temptation to use limited data in support of broad policy strategies.0 6 Moreover, the
three open system approaches described above are unlikely to indicate the only places in
which research bottlenecks are occurring. Nevertheless, they do suggest that research
bottlenecks, in fact, create significant problems-problems substantial enough that the
research community itself has tried to develop mitigation pathways.
One could argue that the development of these pathways suggests that research
bottlenecks are not a problem with which courts and legislatures should be concerned.
Perhaps those in the relevant field have proven perfectly capable of adapting to any
thickets or bottlenecks that occur. The solutions described above, however, are limited at
best. They cannot cover all participants, they provide only partial solutions to the
problems that they identify, and in some cases, they have met with only limited success.
Thus, they are more useful for confirming the existence of a problem in scientific
104 See Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NlIH Research Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and
Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72,093 (Dec. 23, 1999) (Final Notice)
(discouraging the use of reach-through royalties for research tools).
05 See id (noting in the research-through royalty provisions that "[w]hile these Principles are directly
applicable only to recipients of N IH funding, it is hoped that other not-for-profit and For-profit
organizations will adopt similar policies and refrain from seeking unreasonable restrictions or conditions
when sharing materials").
106 See generally ROBIN FHI)ivMAN, TH- ROIF OF SJNC' F. IN LAW (Forthcoming 2009).
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research than they are for demonstrating the ability of those engaged in scientific research
to solve the problem.
It is particularly interesting to note that all three approaches involve coordinated
efforts. In other words, evidence of coordination of efforts could suggest that the
problems are intractable on an individual level. This is precisely the type of problem that
would benefit from governmental efforts. Again, we should not use the existence of
research bottlenecks to support all manner of broad changes in the patent system. Nor
should we ignore them.
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